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Revolving Doors Agency works across England to change 
systems and improve services for people who face 
multiple and complex needs and come into repeated 
contact with the criminal justice system. The multiple 
problems faced by people in this situation can include 
a combination of poor mental health, substance misuse 
issues, homelessness, poverty, and family breakdown. 
Our mission is to share evidence of effective interventions 
and to promote reform of public services through 
partnership with political leaders, policymakers, 
commissioners, and experts, and by involving people with 
direct experience of the problem in all of our work.
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1. See http://www.revolving-doors.org.uk/partnerships--development/spark/ 
Introduction  
PbR has increasingly been applied as a mechanism for 
funding public services. It has formed a key part of the 
Coalition government’s public service reform agenda, and 
is being employed by national and local commissioners 
as means of tackling entrenched social problems across 
a variety of policy areas, including: welfare to work; 
reoffending; substance misuse; housing and homelessness; 
and support for families facing multiple needs. 
While few disagree with taking a more outcome-focused 
approach to the commissioning of public services in 
principle, the implementation of PbR models has proved 
challenging and controversial, with particular difficulties 
raised in relation to those facing more complex problems. 
Now, with a number of schemes such as the Work 
Programme and Supporting People PbR pilots coming 
towards their end and a general election approaching, 
it is important to learn lessons from how PbR has been 
applied to services for the most vulnerable people.
Informed by the literature on a selection of existing 
schemes and roundtables with relevant stakeholders and 
experts, this briefing focuses on a ‘revolving door’ group 
of individuals who face multiple and complex needs and 
come into repeated contact with the criminal justice 
system and emergency services. It highlights some of the 
key challenges in applying PbR approaches to this group, 
considers how some schemes have sought to overcome 
them, and raises key considerations in five areas:  
1. Setting outcomes that incentivise a holistic,  
person-centred approach.
2. Ensuring outcome measurements and targets  
reflect the need for longer-term, flexible interventions 
supporting the recovery journey.
3. Setting payment structures that support investment  
in an intensive, assertive approach, and prevent 
‘parking’ and ‘creaming.’
4. Promoting a ‘joined-up’ approach.
5. Considering alternatives to PbR.
The use of Payment by Results (PbR) models has 
been increasing across the public sector. Informed by 
stakeholder roundtables and a review of key literature 
on existing PbR schemes, this briefing reflects on how 
PbR is being applied to interventions for people who 
face multiple and complex needs, and raises a number 
of considerations for policymakers and commissioners 
looking to fund services for this group. It forms part of 
our SPARK project of research and dissemination, with 
related briefings focusing on: what service users with 
experience of complex needs identify as important for a 
‘good life’; the evidence-base for comprehensive services 
models for multiple and complex needs; and engaging 
partners to develop a ‘whole-system’ response to these 
issues locally.1   
Reflecting on our knowledge of ‘what works’ for this 
group, and the experience of the varied approaches to 
PbR developed so far, key considerations include:
• Service users should be involved in developing 
outcomes to ensure that they are holistic, realistic, and 
adequately reflect both needs and what is important to 
clients.
• Outcome measurement should support long-term 
recovery for a group that are often poorly served 
by existing services, rather than processing them 
towards a single outcome more effectively.  
• Schemes must be adequately resourced to provide 
intensive, relational support up-front, helping to build  
a strong foundation for recovery.
• Commissioners and policymakers should take a 
‘whole system’ view, pooling resources from a range 
of partners and supporting targeted approaches for 
this group to unlock savings from other parts of the 
system. 
• PbR is not always an appropriate model, and 
significant challenges remain in applying this approach 
to services for those facing multiple and complex 
needs. Commissioners should have a clear rationale 
for why PbR is the right model to achieve their aims, 
and reflect on the experience of PbR schemes so 
far in considering alternative ways to support an 
outcome-focused approach.     
SUMMARY
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1: PbR and multiple and 
complex needs 
1.1  Services for people facing 
multiple and complex needs
Many potential clients of current PbR schemes face 
multiple and complex needs – a combination of 
interrelated problems including poor mental health, 
substance misuse, homelessness, repeat offending, and 
poverty. Mainstream public services, working in silos, 
have traditionally struggled to respond effectively to 
these individuals, leaving people caught in a ‘revolving 
door’ cycle where they come into repeat contact with the 
police, criminal justice system, and emergency services. It 
is estimated that there are around 60,000 people in this 
situation at any one time across England, with many more 
at risk of entering it. 
People facing multiple and complex needs experience: 
• Chaotic lives 
• Multiple and interrelated problems at once
• Exclusion from mainstream services, but high  
use of emergency and criminal justice services
• Social exclusion, and poor or non-existent  
family ties
• Economic exclusion and poverty
• Multiple relapses in recovery.
Despite these challenges, there is a growing understanding 
of (and evidence base for) the kind of interventions 
that can help people in this situation to overcome their 
problems and turn their lives around.3 Informed by 
desistance and recovery theory, as well as our research 
and development work in local areas, Revolving Doors 
Agency have identified 10 emerging principles for effective 
services working with this group:
1. ‘Someone on your side’: Opportunity to build 
consistent, positive and trusting relationships.
2. Assertive and persistent: An assertive and persistent 
approach to engagement that does not give up on 
people. Continuous and consistent support over 
a prolonged period, responding positively and 
constructively to setbacks.
3. Tailored: A personalised approach which addresses 
the full gambit of an individuals’ needs. Is culturally 
sensitive to particular needs of specific groups 
including women, people of black and minority  
ethnic backgrounds and young adults.
4. Building on strengths: Supports the client to recognise 
and develop personal strengths, recognising more 
than a ‘bundle of needs and problems’.
5. Coordinated and seamless: Understands and links 
with other services, pulls services together around 
the client, helps clients to access and coordinate 
support through brokerage and advocacy. Ensures 
continuous support across key transitions, avoiding 
gaps in care.
6. Flexible and responsive: Flexible approach to support 
and an ability to react quickly in a crisis.
7. ‘No wrong door’: If a service cannot provide support 
they take responsibility for connecting the client with 
someone who can.
8. Trauma informed: Understands the emotional and 
behavioural impact of traumatic childhood and life 
experiences on clients and vicarious trauma on staff, 
avoids re-traumatisation, facilitates reflective practice, 
builds resilience and supports recovery.
9. Coproduced: Designed in partnership with  
service users.
10. Strategically supported: Has the buy-in of senior, 
strategic stakeholders.
1.2  Payment by Results (PbR) 
Increasingly, services working with this group are 
being commissioned on an outcomes-based approach. 
This includes the application of PbR, which provides a 
mechanism to pay providers according to the outcomes 
that they achieve. PbR has been seen as a means of solving 
a range of major public service problems in a difficult fiscal 
climate, with schemes being piloted or rolled out across 
a number of sectors including criminal justice, welfare to 
work, housing and homelessness, substance misuse, and 
family support.   
In principle, PbR models offer a number of benefits, and 
ministers and other advocates have claimed that they:
• Create greater efficiency and higher quality through  
an improved focus on outcomes, rather than inputs  
and outputs.
2. See Audit Commission (2012) Local payment by results. Brief ing: payment by results for local services. London: Audit Commission & Cabinet Office guidance 
available here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guidance-on-the-template-contract-for-social-impact-bonds. 
3. See Revolving Doors Agency and Centre for Mental Health (2015) Comprehensive Services for complex needs: A summary of the evidence for a review of the 
evidence-base for three models providing comprehensive support for multiple and complex needs.
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4. NCVO (2014) Payment by Results and the voluntary sector, London, NCVO. p.4.
5. See Audit Commission (2012) Local payment by results. Brief ing: payment by results for local services. London: Audit Commission.
6. See for example Crowe, D., Gash, T., Kippin, H. (2014) Beyond Big Contracts: Commissioning public services for better outcomes.  
London: Collaborate & Institute for Government.
7. NCVO Payment by Results: Public Services quoted in House of Commons Library note Delivering public services: The growing use of Payment by Results 
(standard note SN/HA/6621), p.6. available here: http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN06621/delivering-public-
services-the-growing-use-of-payment-by-results. 
• Drive innovation through a ‘black box’ approach, 
opening up public service provision to new providers, 
and allowing these providers to innovate.
• Allow flexibility by reducing service specifications, 
enabling providers to tailor their service to the client’s 
needs in order to achieve outcomes. 
• Share the risk of preventative interventions, making 
investment more viable as the costs of failed 
interventions are not felt solely by the public purse.
However, despite enthusiasm from both the Coalition 
and the previous Labour government, there has been 
widespread criticism of PbR in practice. As a recent 
report by NCVO reflects:
“ The principles of paying for impact and commissioning 
for outcomes are not commonly disputed. However, the way 
programmes are being designed and implemented is leading 
to questions about the viability of PbR as a method for 
improving public service delivery and for providing quality 
outcomes for service users.4 ”  
Implementing PbR is certainly not as simple as it appears 
in principle. Guidance for commissioners from the Audit 
Commission and Cabinet Office highlights a range of 
significant challenges to balance in designing PbR models.5  
Reflecting on the principles of effective support for 
multiple and complex needs identified above corroborates 
the view that these challenges are even more significant 
when applied to this client group. 
Key difficulties include: 
• Defining outcomes or ‘results’, and keeping outcome 
metrics simple - Where PbR schemes are considered 
to work more effectively with a limited number of 
simple, easily measurable outcomes, services for this 
group must respond to a range of problems at once. 
• Supporting long-term recovery - While PbR can be 
effective in driving efficiencies by focusing providers on 
achieving short-term outcomes, services for this group 
must be flexible and invest in long-term engagement to 
tackle complex and entrenched problems.
• Avoiding perverse incentives - preventing providers 
from ‘gaming’ the system, including ‘parking’ the 
hardest (or most resource intensive) to help in their 
cohort and ‘creaming’ or ‘cherry picking’ the easiest 
cases to meet targets. 
• Attributing cause to a particular intervention - Where 
PbR works best when outcomes can be closely linked 
to the activity of a particular provider, effective 
services for this group rely on the coordination of 
interventions from a range of partners, and on factors 
beyond the remit of traditional service provision.
These challenges have led many to question whether 
PbR is an appropriate model for this client group at all.6  
Indeed, some have raised concerns that applying such 
models to services working with this group could  
be harmful: 
 Many services don’t have easily definable nor final 
results. Great swathes of services don’t have positive 
outcomes – but act to mitigate the further worsening  
of negative conditions, social isolation, or social injustice… 
Such services could lose direct state investment, or needs 
assessment, or infrastructure support, or could be reframed 
around artif icial and forced ‘results’, rather than the needs 
of the individual receiving the intervention. Users could be 
forced towards ‘results’ that are inappropriate, by providers 
needing to reach payment thresholds.7 
Section 2 reflects on the experience of applying PbR 
approaches to people in this ‘revolving door’ situation. 
Given the continued lack of evidence as to whether 
or not PbR works to improve outcomes for this client 
group, we do not make recommendations for or against 
PbR here. Rather, by reflecting on how existing PbR 
schemes have sought to overcome challenges, we raise 
key considerations for commissioners and policymakers 
seeking to fund services for people facing multiple and 
complex needs, which we hope will be helpful whether 
developing a PbR model or considering alternative 
outcome-based approaches. 
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8. See https://www.gov.uk/social-impact-bonds. 
9. Crowe et al (2014) Beyond Big Contracts, p. 27.
10. See NCVO (2014) Payment by Results and the voluntary sector pp. 27- 32 for a fuller discussion of the impact of PbR models on personalisation.  
11. Department for Communities and Local Government (2012) The Troubled Families programme: Financial Framework for the Troubled Families programme’s payment-by-results 
scheme for local authorities London: DCLG, p.9.
2: Applying PbR 
approaches - key 
challenges and 
considerations 
In theory, people in the ‘revolving door’ situation 
described above could qualify for a number of current 
PbR schemes simultaneously. However, within each of 
these they are likely to be identified as among the ‘hardest 
to help’ – those seemingly furthest from achieving the 
particular outcomes that the scheme focuses on.  
There is huge variety in how different PbR schemes have 
developed and how they are configured. They vary from 
large, centrally commissioned government programmes 
using a ‘prime provider’ model and complicated supply 
chains (such as the Work Programme and Transforming 
Rehabilitation model), to smaller-scale locally 
commissioned schemes working with a more targeted 
cohort – with a range of national pilot programmes such 
as the Drug and Alcohol Recovery pilots or Supporting 
People pilots in-between. 
There are different ways of financing schemes, such 
as Social Impact Bonds where the initial risk is taken 
by private social investors receiving a return when 
social outcomes are achieved,8 or justice reinvestment 
approaches which reward providers for reducing demand 
(and costs) on criminal justice agencies. 
There is also huge variation in the detail of how contracts 
are designed in terms of: 
• The type of outcome measures adopted  
by different schemes 
• The number of outcomes specified 
• The time-period over which outcomes are measured 
• Whether outcomes are measured on an individual  
or a cohort basis 
• The size of the cohorts involved 
• The proportion of payment that is ‘at risk’  
in the contract. 
While the sheer variation between existing schemes 
makes it difficult to evaluate the impact of PbR approaches 
on this group as a whole, it also provides a plethora of 
different attempts to overcome identified challenges in 
applying outcome-based approaches to services for people 
facing multiple and complex needs. This provides some 
useful considerations for commissioners seeking a more 
outcomes-based approach to commissioning for this group. 
Key considerations for commissioners include: 
2.1  Setting outcomes to 
incentivise a holistic, person-
centred approach
Driving a focus on outcomes is central to PbR. However, 
while this sounds promising in principle, in practice 
commissioners have often found it difficult to set 
meaningful outcomes and measurable targets for this 
group. As the Institute for Government’s Beyond Big 
Contracts report states:
 Provider incentives and rewards are likely to be 
increasingly tied to achieving specified outcomes or their 
proxies, despite a reported confusion and lack of clarity as 
to how outcomes might be defined and understood. As such, 
outcome-based commissioning does not always lead to a 
focus on meaningful outcomes that relate to user needs, 
particularly in cases of multiple, complex needs.9  
An overreliance on single and simple metrics that most 
suit PbR models risks pushing people to fit that single 
outcome, rather than taking the personalised and holistic 
approach that has been shown to work for this group.10
Overly simplistic outcomes can also encourage providers 
to prioritise working with those who are closer to 
achieving their target above those who face a combination 
of problems.  
Approaches from existing schemes seeking to overcome 
these challenges include:  
• Using multiple outcomes: the Troubled Families 
programme, for example, measures across a range 
of outcomes relevant to families facing multiple 
and complex problems, including offending; school 
attendance; anti-social behaviour; and employment, 
with a proportion of PbR payment attached to each.11  
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London’s rough sleeping SIB also employs a number 
of outcome indicators including reduced A&E visits, 
sustained employment for clients, and an overall 
reduction in rough sleeping.12     
• Co-designing outcomes: In some of the more locally-
driven schemes, such as the Supporting People 
pilots and some of the Drug and Alcohol pilots, 
commissioners have sought to engage with current 
and former service users as well as providers as they 
set their outcomes under a PbR approach.13 This could 
help to develop more person-centred outcomes that 
are realistic, and more accurately reflect the need that 
they are trying to meet – as the Dartington report on 
12. See Department for Communities and Local Government (2014a) Qualitative evaluation for the London Homelessness Social Impact Bond: First Interim Report London: DCLG, p. vii.
13. See DCLG (2014b) Supporting People Payment by Results pilots: Final Evaluation p. 34-35; Donmall, M., et al (2012) Drug and alcohol PbR evaluation: scoping and feasibility report. 
Manchester, University of Manchester. 
14. Research in Practice for Adults (2008) Outcome based commissioning and contracting Dartington, Research in Practice for Adults.
15. Revolving Doors Agency (2015) ‘A Good life’: Exploring what outcomes are prioritised by people facing multiple and complex needs. London, Revolving Doors Agency. 
16. See http://www.birmingham.gov.uk/cs/Satellite?c=Page&childpagename=Housing%2FPageLayout&cid=1223092722073&pagename=BCC%2FCommon%2FWrapper%2FWr
apper for further details. Summary also available in DCLG (2014b) Supporting People payment by results pilots: f inal evaluation, p. 47-48
17. DCLG (2014b) Supporting People Payment by Results pilots: Final Evaluation, p. 34-35.
18. Ibid, p. 34-35.
19. Russell Webster’s Blog, “The 3rd commandment of PbR: thy metrics shall be simple”, available at:  
http://www.russellwebster.com/the-3rd-commandment-of-pbr-thy-metrics-shall-be-simple/.
20. DCLG (2014b) Supporting People Payment by Results pilots, Final Evaluation, p.33-34.
the potential for outcome-based commissioning states, 
“a focus on outcomes which encourages service users to 
express the outcomes they want for themselves provides 
scope for user empowerment and choice.”14
• A focus on quality: Service users engaged in the 
research for our ‘A Good Life’ report highlighted the 
importance of focusing on the quality of outcomes 
achieved for this group if they are to form a strong 
foundation to long-term recovery and desistence, 
rather than a simple yes/no of whether this outcome 
is achieved.15 Measures of quality, including user 
satisfaction with the services, could form part  
of the outcome mix monitored for schemes. 
Birmingham has undertaken an extensive payment by 
results pilot in housing support services between April 
2013–March 2014. The pilot involved 20 providers, 21 
services, and 1,468 service users across a range of services 
for socially excluded and vulnerable people, with payment 
by results representing 10% of the contract value. 
The pilot and the outcome metrics were designed in 
consultation with providers, stakeholders, and a service 
user reference group (Citizens Panel). A framework with 
18 outcomes was selected, five of which are agreed with 
each individual service user and payment linked to these 
outcomes. For each individual, outcomes will include:
• Two overarching outcomes relating to achieving 
independence (maintaining or obtaining suitable 
accommodation) and accessing primary health services
• One further mandatory outcome specific to each 
different client group
• Two further ‘client choice’ outcomes selected by the 
client. Each client could also select further ‘personal 
outcomes’ on top of these 5, which would not form 
part of the payment structure. 
In many cases, payment for outcomes could also be 
made using a ‘distance travelled’ approach. Although the 
Birmingham City pilot does not form part of the national 
Supporting People pilot programme, similar approaches 
adopting multiple outcomes and involving service users on 
their initial design were also adopted in a number  
of these areas, including Stockport and Cheshire West  
and Chester.17
EXAMPLE A: ‘BASKET OF OUTCOMES’: BIRMINGHAM  
CITY COUNCIL SUPPORTING PEOPLE PILOT16
Adopting multiple outcomes, designed alongside service 
users, appears to provide a positive model in relation to 
the key principles of effective support described in section 
1.1 above. Indeed, in some cases such as the evaluation of 
the Supporting People pilots it has been reported to have 
encouraged improvements in tailored support planning 
with clients.18  
However, it should be noted that PbR schemes are 
widely considered to work best with simple outcomes 
and metrics,19 and such approaches could raise challenges 
by adding to the complexity of the scheme and the 
administrative burden placed on both commissioners and 
providers. Both the Drug and Alcohol Recovery pilots 
and some of the Supporting People pilots have faced 
criticism for the complexity of their outcomes.20 It may 
be that some of the benefits of such an outcome driven 
approach can be achieved without attaching payment to 
the outcomes specifically (see 2.5 on page 15), however 
if a PbR approach is adopted, there is a need to achieve a 
balance between an adequate range of outcomes and the 
need for simplicity in the model. 
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21. See Revolving Doors Agency and Centre for Mental Health (2015) Comprehensive Services for complex needs: A summary of the evidence.
22. DCLG (2014b) Supporting people pilots: Final evaluation p.39.
Key considerations
• There are significant challenges in balancing  
the need for PbR models to use simple payment  
metrics with a desire to provide multiple  
outcomes and outcome types that more  
accurately reflect the needs of this group.  
• Collecting data across a range of outcomes is 
important in taking a holistic view for clients  
with multiple and complex needs, whether  
payments are attached to these outcomes or not.  
• User satisfaction outcomes could be explored  
as part of the picture, ensuring that service users  
are placed at the heart of the approach and there  
is a focus on quality from the service user’s 
perspective.
• There is an opportunity for outcomes to be  
designed in partnership with services users,  
ensuring that the outcomes are realistic and  
reflect the needs that they are trying to meet.
2.2  Ensuring outcome 
measurement and targets reflects 
the need for longer-term, flexible 
interventions supporting the 
recovery journey
People facing multiple and complex needs often 
experience a lengthy and challenging journey to recovery 
(and if caught in a cycle of offending, to desistence 
from crime). This journey is likely to be characterised 
by multiple periods of relapse, and the most effective 
approaches offer flexible and open-ended engagement 
over long periods, with time for frontline professionals  
to build a strong relationship with the client.21    
In this context, it is unrealistic to expect a provider to 
work intensively with someone for a long period if they 
only receive payment for a single, ideal, and potentially 
distant outcome such as complete desistance from 
crime, complete abstinence from substance misuse, or 
sustained employment. Furthermore, outcomes measured 
over short time-periods place unrealistic pressures on 
providers working with this group, and on the service 
users themselves who are often in recovery from years  
of entrenched social exclusion. One recent evaluation,  
for example, found that “in some instances it appears 
providers are forfeiting payment to ensure they can offer 
clients the support they need (e.g. through longer than average 
support periods)”.22 
PbR schemes aiming to impact those facing multiple and 
complex needs must avoid driving a focus on short-term 
outcomes, and adopt measures which enable longer-
term engagement that can support the recovery process. 
Existing schemes have employed a number of approaches:  
• Using intermediate/distance travelled outcomes: 
Schemes as diverse as the large, centrally contracted 
Work Programme (see Example B on page 12) and the 
smaller, localised Drug and Alcohol pilots have used 
a model which includes some payment for progress 
towards outcomes. These measures can represent 
significant progress for an individual facing multiple 
and complex needs in terms of quality of life and 
harm reduction (e.g. reduced alcohol consumption; 
involvement in volunteering as a step towards 
employment). These could also include outcomes 
that are highly valued by commissioners and other 
public sector partners, including reduced demand on 
particular services (e.g. A&E or police custody) or 
sustained engagement with the service, which can be 
an achievement in itself with this complex client group.  
 • Including ‘frequency’ measures: Schemes such as the 
Peterborough Social Impact Bond targeting short 
sentenced prisoners have adopted a ‘frequency’ 
outcome measure, whereby providers are rewarded for 
reducing the number of offences across a cohort rather 
than a ‘binary’ measure that only rewards complete 
desistence from crime. Measures which recognise 
progress in terms of reduced frequency or seriousness 
related to the problem, rather than relying exclusively 
on binary measures, could remove some of the 
incentive towards short-termism and ‘parking’ of the 
most complex cases, while enabling providers to remain 
engaged with individual clients over longer periods and 
placing a higher priority on harm-reduction. 
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23. See NCVO (2014) Payment by Results and the Voluntary Sector p. 10.
24. Ibid, p. 4.
25. Audit Commission (2012) Local Payment by Results, p. 16. 
26. Donmall, M., et al. (2014) Evaluation of the Drugs and Alcohol Recovery Payment by Results Pilot Programme: Interim Summary Report. Manchester: University of Manchester, p. 
4.   
27. DCLG (2014a) Qualitative Evaluation of the London Homelessness Social Impact Bond: First Interim Report. London: DCLG.
 Key considerations
• There is a need to support long-term  
interventions with this client group, which  
funding streams focused entirely on a single  
payable outcome after one year are unlikely  
to meet.
• Relapse is part of the recovery journey.  
Schemes paid on a PbR basis must enable  
a flexible approach which does not penalise  
when clients re-engage with a service.  
• Including intermediate or ‘distance travelled’ 
outcomes can help commissioners to incentivise 
longer-term support.
• In some cases, frequency measures or other 
measures on a cohort basis may encourage  
providers to work with more complex cases,  
and place a higher priority on harm-reduction.
2.3  Setting payment structures 
that support investment in an 
intensive, assertive approach, and 
prevent ‘parking’ and ‘creaming’
Even where outcomes are carefully selected and measured, 
the way payments are attached to them in a PbR model 
can leave providers less willing to take the risk of investing 
in intensive support for more complex clients where they 
might be able to chase easier wins elsewhere. There are 
particular challenges for voluntary sector agencies, who 
often provide targeted and specialist intervention for this 
complex group but lack working capital and reserves to 
enable them to take on the higher risks involved under 
PbR.23 As a recent NCVO report states:
 Voluntary organisations are…facing PbR payment 
models which do not provide sufficient incentives for 
working with service users who require more complex, 
sustained, or costly interventions, and there is concern  
about the impact which PbR is having on personalised 
outcomes.24 
Schemes designed for a wider cohort, including many 
of the large centrally-commissioned schemes, face a 
higher risk of ‘parking’ and ‘creaming’, and it is a key 
criticism of the Work Programme that despite adopting a 
differential payment model , payments were not adequate 
to incentivise work with the more complex client groups 
(see Example B on page 12). Payments must be adequately 
structured to incentivise the intensive, assertive support 
required when beginning working with people facing 
multiple and complex needs. Approaches taken in some 
existing PbR schemes include:
• Attachment fees/fees for service: As the audit 
commission briefing on local PbR acknowledges “small 
financial incentives can have large positive effects, so it may 
not be necessary to put all the payment at risk”25. In reality 
very few schemes adopt a ‘pure’ PbR approach whereby 
100% of the provider’s payment depends on outcomes 
achieved, with many schemes targeted at more complex 
clients including substantial attachment fees. Some 
Supporting People pilots, for example, adopted an 80% 
fee for service, with Birmingham offering 90%. Although 
this lessens the PbR incentive (and the transfer of risk), 
this may help to make upfront investment in intensive 
support for this group more viable.  
• Differential payment: Some models such as the Drug 
and Alcohol Recovery pilots and the Work Programme 
(see Example B on page 12) offer a differential 
payment model, with greater rewards available for 
more ‘complex’ cases. However, this has often proved 
difficult to implement. In the case of some of the 
Drug and Alcohol pilots it has complicated the model, 
and been criticised as impacting negatively on the 
service delivered to clients as their first contact is a 
bureaucratic assessment to place them in a payment 
group, rather than accessing support.26  
• Targeted schemes: Schemes that are targeted more 
specifically at this group may avoid this problem, with 
a representative from London’s Rough Sleeping SIB 
at a recent roundtable commenting that there was 
no “low-hanging fruit” in the cohort, so the scheme 
was necessarily tailored to work with those with the 
most complex needs.27 As with the Troubled Families 
programme, criteria for selection for certain schemes 
could be targeted specifically at those facing the 
most complex problems and driving high demand for a 
range of  services locally, rather than starting from the 
perspective of a particular service silo. 
10 ADDING VALUE?
28. See Roncile et al (2014) Social Impact Bonds: The state of play for further information on the opportunities and challenges around SIBs and where this approach may be 
appropriate. Available here: http://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/sioutcomesfunds.  
29. National Audit Office (2014) Report – the Work programme, July 2014 pp. 29-36. 
30. CESI/DWP, Work Programme Evaluation: Findings from the f irst phase of qualitative research on programme delivery, p.111.
31. National Audit Office, Report – the Work Programme, July 2014.
32. Cited in Feargal McGuinness and Aliyah Dar, Work Programme Brief ing from the House of Commons Library, 23 June 2014.
• Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) also provide a means of 
accessing up-front investment from social investors and 
removing the risk directly from the provider. This can 
provide a means of accessing investment to test out 
new approaches for this group and helping to build the 
evidence-base where commissioners are uncertain of 
the evidence for a particular approach and unwilling to 
take the initial risk.28   
Cutting across all of these themes is the need for 
appropriate pricing to ensure that the intensive work 
required is adequately resourced. For this client group, 
who are traditionally poorly served by support services, 
commissioners should avoid the short-term focus of 
competing contracts on cost, and focus on achieving 
value by improving long-term outcomes. Taking a broader 
view, commissioners can make the case for intervention 
in terms of reduced demand elsewhere (in particular 
criminal justice and emergency services), leveraging funds 
for their scheme from the services and budgets that are 
likely to benefit (see 2.4).
The Work Programme is a centrally commissioned 
national PbR programme aiming to move the long-term 
unemployed into sustainable employment. It is delivered 
across 18 regional areas on a ‘prime provider’ model, with 
private and large voluntary sector prime providers sub-
contracting to other agencies to provide more specialist 
support. The PbR element of the contract has grown each 
year, and as of 2014 the Work Programme is ‘pure’ PbR, 
with 100% of payment dependent on meeting the chosen 
outcome measures.
The design of the payment structure aimed to learn from 
previous PbR approaches in the welfare to work sector, 
including two key features:
• Use of ‘distance travelled’ measures, with an initial 
payment on job attachment and further payments for 
sustained employment.  
• A ‘differential payment’ model, intended to encourage 
providers to focus resources on those furthest from 
employment by placing clients in different payment 
groups and increasing the financial incentive for those 
judged furthest away from the labour market (including 
homeless people, prison leavers, most ESA claimants, 
and former Incapacity Benefit claimants).  
However, despite these measures a recent National Audit 
Office report concluded that “the Work Programme 
has not improved performance for Employment and 
Support Allowance claimants”. While the scheme is now 
performing reasonably well for most JSA claimants, only 
11% of the main ESA payment group who have completed 
the Work Programme have secured a job outcome, while 
investment by prime contractors in the ‘hardest-to-help’ 
groups has reduced by an average of 54% per person 
from their original bids.29 Evaluations and reports from 
support providers suggest that Work Programme clients 
with complex needs are often being ‘parked’, with a CESI/
DWP evaluation concluding that job-ready participants are 
“frequently intentionally” seen more often than those with 
“high or multiple barriers”.30  
Attendees at our roundtables felt that the differential 
payment model was neither adequately designed, nor 
resourced to work with more complex clients. This 
corroborates the finding of the National Audit Office, 
who found that providers were not using the payment 
groups to help target support.31 Some providers have also 
reported that they did not feel they should be the ones 
helping the ‘hardest to reach’,32 suggesting that people 
facing more complex needs and barriers to employment 
should receive a more targeted approach. 
EXAMPLE B: LESSONS FROM  
THE WORK PROGRAMME
Key Considerations
• Payment structures must provide adequate 
resources. Value for money in tackling multiple  
and complex needs will be achieved by working with 
clients to support long-term recovery, rather than 
processing them towards a single outcome more 
efficiently in the short-term.
• Attachment fees reduce the PbR incentive, but  
could enable providers to invest in the kind of 
intensive and assertive support that is required  
to engage with this group.  
• Targeted schemes can be tailored more effectively 
to this complex client group, offering fewer 
opportunities for ‘parking’ and ‘creaming’ by  
focusing exclusively on this group, and starting  
with the client’s needs.   
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33. Audit Office (2012) Local Payment by Results p. 8.
34. See Revolving Doors Agency and Centre for Mental Health (2015) Comprehensive Services for complex needs: A summary of the evidence.
35. Wong, K. et al (2013) Youth Justice Reinvestment Custody Pathfinder: Findings and delivery lessons from the f irst year of implementation. Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University
36. Final evaluation of the youth and adult justice reinvestment pilots forthcoming. Latest reports and statistics available here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/justice-
reinvestment-pilots-second-year-results. 
37. See http://communitybudgets.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Tri-borough-Reducing-Reoffending-Business-Case_FINAL-004.pdf and Westminster Council, Executive 
Decision Report, 7 Jan 2013: http://www3.westminster.gov.uk/CSU/Cabinet%20Member%20Decisions/Community%20Protection%20and%20Premises/3%20-%20
Reoffending%20Service/Tri-borough%20Reducing%20Reoffending%20Service.doc. 
2.4  Promoting a joined-up 
approach 
Responding effectively to people with multiple and complex 
needs requires a joined-up approach, coordinating access 
to a variety of interventions that can address the full range 
of their problems and enable them to turn their lives 
around. A significant challenge in coordinating responses to 
this group currently is that mainstream public services too 
often operate in silos, which are reinforced by their budgets 
and funding schemes, their systems of accountability, and 
the departmental structures of Whitehall.
In theory, PbR presents an opportunity to support better 
coordinated interventions by opening up service delivery 
to a range of providers and allowing them innovate and 
work in partnership, rewarding them as this approach 
achieves the expected results. However, there is currently 
a significant danger that existing PbR schemes are simply 
recreating and reinforcing silos as they continue to be 
developed in isolation by individual commissioners and 
government department using their own methods and 
primary aims. People facing multiple and complex needs 
could potentially fit into a number of current PbR schemes 
simultaneously, however as the ‘hardest to help’ in each of 
these schemes evidence suggest that they are missing out.    
In moving towards outcome-based models, commissioners 
should seek to join up funding streams and work with 
partners with a shared interest in tackling multiple and 
complex needs. Promising approaches include: 
• Joint commissioning and pooled budgets: As the Audit 
Commissions local PbR briefing states, “if the outcomes 
[of a PbR scheme] are affected by other public, private, or 
voluntary services, then those bodies may need to be joint 
commissioners”.33 The development of community budgets 
and other means of pooling funds locally provides a 
promising model for improved funding of services for 
this group. The Tri-borough community budget (see 
box c below) has developed a PbR model targeting 
short-sentenced prisoners, and other models to joint-
commission services for this group around shared 
outcomes should be explored by local commissioners.  
• Reinvesting savings from reduced demand: Evidence 
suggests that effective services for this group (see 1.1 
on pages 4 and 5) can reduce demand on emergency 
and criminal justice services.34 In some areas, a form 
of PbR has been piloted providing a mechanism to 
reinvest savings from reduced demand in preventative 
interventions in the community. The Youth Justice 
Reinvestment Pathfinder schemes, for example, aimed 
to reduce the use of custody for young people and 
encourage better use of alternative interventions and 
prevention. The scheme offers an up-front payment 
(whether to an independent provider or a local authority) 
to provide an intervention, with a clawback model if this 
service fails to reduce demand.35 While implementation 
challenges mean that different pilot schemes have 
generated different results,36 commissioners should 
continue to consider how to reinvest savings from 
reduced demand, taking a ‘whole system’ view and 
monitoring demand on other services to help make the 
case for shifting funds and providing greater investment in 
community-based preventative work.  
London’s Tri-borough Whole Place Community 
Budget (Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith and 
Fulham and Westminster) has developed a two year 
reducing reoffending pilot, which has been operating 
since October 2013. Previously, different agencies 
were spending around £6 million on nine different 
reducing reoffending programmes, with reconviction 
rates still rising. By coordinating this funding with 
further support from the Mayor’s Office for Policing 
and Crime, they have developed a service aiming to 
provide personalised, comprehensive, through-the-
gate support targeting short-sentenced prisoners: 
the group with the highest reoffending rates, many of 
whom face multiple and complex needs.37  
The service is provided by voluntary sector 
organisations with a PbR element, with 25% of the 
contract value made in quarterly payments dependent 
on interim crime and health outcomes (a reduction 
in arrests for key client groups and sustained drug 
treatment and/or care plan in place) and an eventual 
10% outcome payment based on an overall reduction in 
reconviction events for short-sentenced prisoners. The 
services includes custody referral provision; through the 
gate support; and a personalised ‘key worker’ approach, 
including access to a personalised commissioning fund 
enabling the provider to request funding for bespoke 
services to support individualised packages of care.
EXAMPLE C: REDUCING 
REOFFENDING IN THE  
TRI-BOROUGH COMMUNITY 
BUDGET
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However, it should be noted that many of the approaches 
taken to try and overcome these significant challenges have 
taken them further from a ‘pure’ PbR approach: 
• Adopting multiple outcomes rather than a single,  
simple focus 
• Paying large attachment fees that reduce  
the ‘PbR’ element 
• Paying providers for intermediary outcomes that reflect 
progress made, rather than offering a strictly ‘black box’ 
approach.
As guidance from the Audit Commission makes clear, 
“PbR is not the only type of contract that rewards good 
performance, and commissioners should always consider other 
options alongside PbR to choose the most suitable approach”.41 
In many cases, it is likely the aims of commissioners 
considering PbR (a more flexible approach; improved 
focus on outcomes; a focus on recovery and reduced 
demand) could also be met without attaching significant 
payment to outcomes. Commissioners should consider 
applying the key considerations set out throughout this 
briefing in developing alternative models to drive an 
outcome-focused approach, and have a clear rationale  
as to why PbR represents the most appropriate model  
if it is adopted.42   
Key Considerations
• PbR is not always the most appropriate approach, 
and significant challenges remain in applying PbR 
to service for people facing multiple and complex 
needs.
• Many of the features developed by existing PbR 
schemes to overcome the challenges of applying 
PbR to this group have taken them further from 
applying a ‘pure’ PbR approach. 
• Commissioners should consider alternatives to 
paying by results for this group, while maintaining a 
focus on outcomes and monitoring cost-benefit to 
the system as a whole. 
Key Considerations
• There are significant risks that PbR schemes can 
simply reinforce the existing silos that have led to 
poor service responses for this group.
• Commissioners should seek to pool funds around 
shared outcomes to develop targeted approaches  
to this group.
• Savings come from taking a ‘whole system’ view and 
reducing high demand on emergency and criminal 
justice services in the long-run.    
• Monitoring reduced demand on criminal justice and 
emergency services can play a key role in making 
a case for further investment in preventative 
community-based services. Reinvestment 
approaches may also prove a means of leveraging 
funds directly into preventative work. 
2.5  Considering alternatives  
to PbR
A lesson from the literature is that if PbR schemes are 
to work, they must be carefully designed, with clear aims 
and a strong rationale for why it is the most appropriate 
way to meet these aims.38 However, a number of recent 
reports corroborate the view of some attendees at our 
roundtables that some commissioners are adopting PbR 
because it is ‘fashionable’ rather than as part of a clear 
and thought out approach, and there is concern that it “is 
being applied to the wrong sort of services and for the wrong 
reasons”.39 Furthermore, evaluations of existing schemes 
have often identified particular groups within their cohort 
(often those in crisis or facing complex needs) for whom 
it is felt that the PbR approach adopted is not working or 
is inappropriate.40   
Throughout this briefing, we have reflected on the 
experience of existing schemes in applying PbR to services 
for this complex client group, and raised a number of 
considerations for commissioners and policymakers from 
that experience. 
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Conclusion
PbR approaches aim to drive greater efficiency, greater 
flexibility, and an improved focus on outcomes. However, 
their application across different sectors varies greatly, 
and schemes have often faced significant challenges in 
making PbR models work for people who face multiple 
and complex needs. In reflecting on our knowledge of 
‘what works’ for this group, as well as the experience 
of PbR schemes so far, we have raised a number of 
considerations for commissioners who are seeking to fund 
services for people facing multiple and complex needs. 
These include:
• The potential for involving service users in setting 
commissioning outcomes, ensuring the range of 
outcomes selected accurately reflects their priorities 
and need.
• Understanding the long-term investment required to 
support recovery from multiple and complex needs, 
and measuring ‘distance travelled’ rather than simply 
chasing short-term results. 
• The need for appropriate pricing and resourcing to 
drive the right incentives, acknowledging that real 
savings for this group come not from processing people 
more efficiently in the short-term, but through working 
intensively with them to support recovery and reduce 
use of costly emergency and criminal justice services in 
the long run. 
• Pooling resources with partners and leverage funding to 
support targeted interventions that can be tailored more 
effectively to address the needs of this client group. 
Crucially, it is important to note that PbR is not ‘the only 
game in town’, and there remain significant challenges in 
applying it to this complex client group. Commissioners 
opting for this approach should have a clear rationale 
for adopting PbR mechanisms, and engage extensively 
with service users and providers to set the framework. 
However, they should also learn from the lessons 
highlighted above in considering alternative outcome-
based commissioning approaches which are conducive to 
encouraging the kind of intensive, personalised, joined-up, 
long-term and relational support that is most effective in 
working with the complex client group.
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Appendix: Summary of key considerations
1. There are significant challenges in balancing the  
need for PbR models to use simple payment metrics 
with a desire to provide multiple outcomes and 
outcome types that more accurately reflect the  
needs of this group.  
2. Collecting data across a range of outcomes is 
important in taking a holistic view for clients with 
multiple and complex needs, whether payments  
are attached to these outcomes or not.  
3. User satisfaction outcomes could be explored as part 
of the picture, ensuring that service users are placed 
at the heart of the approach and there is a focus on 
quality from the service user’s perspective.
4. There is an opportunity for outcomes to be designed 
in partnership with services users, ensuring that the 
outcomes are realistic and reflect the needs that they 
are trying to meet.
5. There is a need to support long-term interventions 
with this client group, which funding streams focused 
entirely on a single payable outcome after one year 
are unlikely to meet. 
6. Relapse is part of the recovery journey. Schemes  
paid on a PbR basis must enable a flexible approach 
which does not penalise when clients re-engage  
with a service.  
7. Including intermediate or ‘distance travelled’ 
outcomes can help commissioners to incentivise 
longer-term support
8. In some cases, frequency measures or other measures 
on a cohort basis may encourage providers to work 
with more complex cases, and place a higher priority 
on harm-reduction.
9. Payment structures must provide adequate resources. 
Value for money in tackling multiple and complex 
needs will be achieved by working with clients to 
support long-term recovery, rather than processing 
them towards a single outcome more efficiently in the 
short-term.
10. Attachment fees reduce the PbR incentive, but could 
enable providers to invest in the kind of intensive 
and assertive support that is required to engage with 
this group.  
11. Targeted schemes can be tailored more effectively to 
this complex client group, offering fewer opportunities 
for ‘parking’ and ‘creaming’ by focusing exclusively on 
this group, and starting with the client’s needs.   
12. There are significant risks that PbR schemes can 
simply reinforce the existing silos that have led to 
poor service responses for this group.
13. Commissioners should seek to pool funds around 
shared outcomes to develop targeted approaches  
to this group.
14. Savings come from taking a ‘whole system’ view and 
reducing high demand on emergency and criminal 
justice services in the long-run.    
15. Monitoring reduced demand on criminal justice 
and emergency services can play a key role in 
making a case for further investment in preventative 
community-based services. Reinvestment approaches 
may also prove a means of leveraging funds directly 
into preventative work. 
16. PbR is not always the most appropriate approach, and 
significant challenges remain in applying PbR to service 
for people facing multiple and complex needs.
17. Many of the features developed by existing PbR 
schemes to overcome the challenges of applying PbR 
to this group have taken them further from applying  
a ‘pure’ PbR approach. 
18. Commissioners should consider alternatives to paying 
by results for this group, while maintaining a focus on 
outcomes and monitoring cost-benefit to the system 
as a whole. 
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